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Abstract
The paper assesses the scope for competition inducing infrastructure regulation in furthering 
the diffusion of innovation. The paper uses data on the adoption of broadband services 
comprising a global panel of 167 countries. The effects of different regulatory provisions are 
assessed. The result of this paper allows qualifying different elements of the regulatory debate 
on the consequences of access requirements, including mandatory unbundling. 
First, it suggests that interplatform competition is generally not leading to acceleration in 
broadband diffusion. Second, with respect to intra-platform competition, this has been 
analyzed at two different levels: full unbundling and retail competition. In the first case the 
competitor is investing in network infrastructure to be able to induce some degree of service 
differentiation. With retail competition the scope for service differentiation is much more 
limited and hence competition is most likely centered on price. While both lead to faster 
diffusion, the results consistently show that the effect from retail competition is proportionally 
about twice as strong compared to unbundling. Moreover, the analysis of the time profile of 
the effects show that this impact on diffusion first increases until the third or fourth year after 
introduction, but then dissipates away. Also here one can argue that retail differentiation leads 
to more intense price competition and therefore faster diffusion. Different robustness checks 
for the results are provided. 
JEL codes: L96, L51, O33 
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1. Introduction 
Until some 20 years ago network utilities were almost exclusively organized by state 
monopolies. Among the reasons for state monopolies were: the public interest in controlling 
industries supplying essential services; the better ability of the state in raising the large scale 
funding required for infrastructure investment; and the perception that a public sector owned 
monopoly was deemed as politically preferable to a privately owned one. However, during the 
last quarter of the century, these basic tenets were questioned from a political point of view. 
Poor performance of state infrastructure monopolies and relative sluggishness in innovation 
led to institutional reforms under the heading of “liberalization”, involving a combination of 
competitive restructuring, privatization and establishment of new regulatory mechanisms 
(Armstrong et al., 1994; Newberry, 1999; Kessides, 2004).  Attention to appropriate 
regulatory measures became an essential ingredient for successful liberalization. The 
conventional wisdom had it that with network utilities economically non-replicable assets 
should in principle be unbundled, horizontally and vertically, with potentially competitive 
segments put under separate ownership from natural monopoly components. Regulation could 
then be confined to the monopoly segment.  
The crux of the matter is that successful liberalization needs a very careful weighting of the 
factors that are influenced by industry specific technology features, firm behavior and 
regulatory incentives (Armstrong and Sappington, 2006). Regulatory provisions moreover 
have very important incentives for investment (Guthrie, 2006), which is ultimately necessary 
to make innovations available for consumers to adopt.  Two broad approaches can be 
identified in restructuring network utilities: vertical separation and competitive access. Both 
approaches have advantages and disadvantages, which affect significantly the performance, 
and everything depends very much on the circumstances. Mandating competitive access is 
less intrusive with respect to ownership, as the incumbent makes bottleneck facilities available on a fair and equal basis, but involves much more demanding regulatory provisions 
in the context of asymmetric information. Vertical separation on the other hand is perhaps less 
demanding for regulation, but it leads to a potential loss of coordination of infrastructure 
provision and economies of scope. However, vertical separation is generally considered as an 
extreme measure when horizontal measures such as mandating access are considered as 
insufficient. Hence most of the regulatory activity is focusing on determining the most 
appropriate conditions for access to network elements. There is relatively little empirical 
literature that has carefully analyzed the consequences for innovation with respect to the 
different types of regulatory provisions. Innovation is on the other hand a very important issue 
with respect to network utilities such as telecommunications, where rapid technological 
innovation has fundamentally shaken up the industry and where the adoption of innovation 
has demonstrably profound consequences for productivity growth.
This paper addresses the question of what form of regulatory mechanism is most conducive in 
advancing innovation in services provided by network utilities, in particular in 
telecommunications. Telecommunications is one of the sectors where regulatory reform has 
been considered as being most successful, especially when looking at the retail price of 
services as benchmarks for success (Winston, 1993). Indeed the real price for 
telecommunications services has declined dramatically, also aided by technological 
innovation in the electronic equipment industry. Sector liberalization and competition has also 
induced very rapid diffusion in innovation. The mobile telecommunications industry is a case 
in point: within some 20 years it acquired the same number of subscribers as the fixed line 
industry managed to achieve in 120 years (Gruber, 2005). Broadband communications, which 
is the most recent major innovation in the telecommunications sector provides an interesting 
field for empirical research as the there are some technological and regulatory features that 
make it quite different from the well studied mobile telecommunications industry. Broadband 
infrastructure has a significant impact on economic growth in industrialized countries (Czernich et al., 2011) and hence there is a public interest in accelerating diffusion. However, 
there is substantial heterogeneity in diffusion of broadband across industrialized countries 
(OECD, 2011) and this has attracted a high level of political attention for identifying factors 
that promote broadband diffusion. The US government’s National Broadband Plan
2 and the 
European Commission’s Digital Agenda for Europe
3 are examples of these perceived 
political priorities for the diffusion of broadband infrastructure access and services. The 
intention of this paper is to identify the factors affecting the diffusion on broadband adoption 
and to provide some insights for the policy discussion. Using a worldwide sample, we test the 
significance of three forms of competition that are induced by appropriate access regulation: 
inter-platform competition; intra-platform competition in the local loop through full 
unbundling; and competition on service, which could be under the form of bit-stream access 
or simple reselling. As policy decisions may be endogenous to market performance we 
additionally use a separate specification with a two-staged approach. Capturing the direct 
effect of policy interventions in the first stage we then use the fitted values of competition 
metrics in the diffusion model. Our results suggest that inter-platform competition is an 
impediment to broadband adoption whereas full and retail unbundling introductions have 
sparked adoption in quite different ways. These results could have significant implications for 
regulatory policies for the sector.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 includes a review of the relevant literature and 
some insights on broadband adoption. In Section 3 the methodology and data are presented 
and discussed. The results are shown in section 4 and a discussion of the outcomes of the 
paper is presented in Section 5. The conclusions are in Section 6.
2. Background on broadband and literature survey 
2 See http://www.broadband.gov 
3 See http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/digital-agendaThe most common networks to provide broadband access are traditional telecommunications 
access networks using copper pair cable in the local loop and the cable TV networks using 
different versions of coaxial cables. In most countries, these infrastructures have been built 
long time ago and hence significant upgrade investments are required to achieve broadband 
transmission capability in the local access network. In the case of telecommunications 
infrastructure, this is achieved by the switch to digital subscriber line (DSL) technology. 
Cable TV infrastructure used to have one way information flow only requires investments that 
allow also for bi-directional flow of traffic. Broadband infrastructure therefore poses a notable 
regulatory challenge as broadband services are to a large extent provided by legacy 
communications infrastructure where the incumbent firm typically has significant market 
power. An international comparison in the wireline access markets shows that for most OECD 
countries the market share of the incumbent wireline firm is well above 90 per cent (OECD, 
2005). Whereas regulatory reform was fairly successful in introducing competition in the 
mobile telecommunications market concentration, this was much less so for the fixed, or 
wireline, network. Regulators are thus loaded with the problem of avoiding that market power 
with the legacy system can be transferred also to the emerging broadband market. There are in 
principle two different policy issues at stake: first, the objective of rapid diffusion of 
broadband access; second, the issue of economic conditions of service provision. Although 
the two issues are interrelated, for the sake of simplicity let us assume them as separate for the 
moment. In the political discourse, diffusion is getting the main attention, as countries are 
typically benchmarked by this parameter. There is a complex relationship between the 
industry structure and innovation (Armstrong and Sappington, 2006), which is linked to the 
weighting of the Schumpeterian element of disruptive innovation triggered by monopolies and 
the fact that under competition the overall market is larger. Though there is evidence for the 
telecommunications industry generally that competition drives diffusion of innovation, this is 
not always the case (Bohlin et al., 2010). For broadband adoption this evidence is even more mixed.  There are several strains of the empirical literature that have assessed the 
determinants for broadband adoption, including individual choice determinants (Madden and 
Simpson, 1997; Rappoport et al., 2003), strategic market considerations (Woroch, 2002) and 
cost of service factors (Gabel and Kwon, 2000; Kim et al., 2003; Cava-Ferreruela and Alabau-
Munoz, 2006). Also regulatory concerns have been taken into account.  Garcia-Murillo (2005) 
finds that unbundling an incumbent’s infrastructure only results in a substantial increase in 
broadband deployment for middle-income countries, but not for their high-income 
counterparts. Similarly, Grosso (2006) finds that competition, income, and unbundling 
increase broadband diffusion. Several studies look also at the role of inter-platform 
competition vs. intra-platform competition. Lee and Marcu (2007) find that platform 
competition is a significant driver of cable modem broadband, but not DSL diffusion. These 
studies typically make reference to OECD countries. But data availability in many cases 
restricts the analysis to a significantly smaller subset of countries, mostly regions with a 
coordinating regulatory authority. Distaso et al. (2006) look at 14 European countries for the 
period 2000-2004 and find that inter-platform competition drives broadband diffusion, but 
that competition in the DSL market does not play a significant role. They also suggest that 
lower unbundling prices stimulate broadband uptake. Denni and Gruber (2006) find in the US 
that both types of competition significantly affect the rate of diffusion, although with different 
effect. Intra-platform competition has a positive impact only initially on the rate of diffusion 
but then dissipates. Inter-platform has a longer-term role in driving the rate of diffusion. They 
also take into account the impact of other variables measuring competition in the 
telecommunications sector as well.
Competition in broadband can be achieved in two ways: first, through service competition on 
the same network facility through open access provisions at varying levels of the network 
infrastructure; second, through facility based competition by means of alternative technology 
platforms. The former will be referred to as intra-platform competition and the latter as inter-platform competition. Bouckaert et al. (2010) have shown for 19 OECD countries that inter-
platform competition has been the main driver for broadband diffusion. Results on intra-
platform competition instead are mixed. 
Substantial regulatory effort during the last decade has been devoted towards creating the 
conditions for equal access, in particular through the unbundling of infrastructure elements for 
local access. The ‘ladder of investment’ theory (Cave, 2006) postulates that initially new 
entrants use the facilities of the incumbent for service based competition, and later invest in 
own infrastructure, i.e. assets with increasing difficulty to replicate. So through unbundling 
service based intra-platform competition would ultimately develop into facility based inter-
platform competition. For providing time consistency to this proposition this would require 
some form of increasing access price or sunset clauses. The practical adoption of such an 
approach is however difficult as the case of the Netherlands show, where regulators had 
difficulties in approving increasing access prices (Rood and te Velde, 2003; Poel, 2006). 
Regulators have to trade off the interests of new entrants for low access prices with the 
interests of the incumbent in terms of long-term incentives for infrastructure investments 
(Pindyck, 2003). Bourreau and Dogan (2004) show that sufficiently low priced unbundling is 
actually a substitute for infrastructure investment by new entrants. Hausman and Sidak (2005) 
discuss how setting cost based prices for unbundled network elements has negative economic 
effects for innovation and new investment. The success of unbundling measures as device for 
reducing incumbent's market power turned out as being mixed so far, with regulators in 
countries such as the U.S. basically giving up on the objective, but with European countries 
continuing on this path. Inducing facility-based competition seems to be the less controversial 
one from a regulatory point of view, provided that markets are capable of accommodating 
alternative infrastructures (Faulhaber and Hagendorn, 2000). See also Cambini and Jiang 
(2009) for a survey of the relationship between regulation and broadband infrastructure 
investment.    The novelty of this paper consists in advancing the empirical research in two directions: first, 
using a dataset with a worldwide coverage of 167 countries covering 11 years: second, using a 
more refined dataset on regulation to identify inter-platform competition and different degrees 
of competition on an intra-platform basis. 
 
3. Methodology and Data 
3.1. Presentation of dataset  
The dataset used in this study comes mainly from two sources. The broadband industry data 
come from Informa Telecoms & Media's World Broadband Information Service. This is a 
proprietary database with quarterly data for incumbents and entrants in the broadband market 
for 167 countries from 2000 until 2010. This is by far the most detailed dataset used in 
broadband adoption studies together. The demographic data come from the World Bank 
statistics. We are primarily interested to identify the adoption effects from different levels of 
mandatory infrastructure sharing that have taken place. However we also look at the platform 
and firm competition that have taken place at the same periods. 
As mentioned, technology adoption has rarely followed a uniform path in different countries. 
Mainly dependent on income, socio economic and demographic factors, national broadband 
markets have evolved in quite dissimilar ways. Across regions the net additions of broadband 
lines and the overall penetration of the technologies are shown in Figure 1. In the Americas 
and the Middle East, net additions continue to rise throughout the decade 2000-2010; Western 
Europe and North America have seen a clear drop in net additions after 2005, Eastern Europe 
net connections started to dwindle a bit later and the rest of the world followed less consistent 
adoption patterns. Africa and Asia/Pacific have experienced alternating periods of higher and 




These pattern are quite similar to the those analyzed in the numerous empirical and theoretical 
technology diffusion studies looking at information and communications technologies in the 
recent past and have identified significant catalysts of adoption and also factors that impede 
technology penetration. In many cases competition is among the key determinants in driving 
penetration, but many other explanatory variables appear with mixed results. This is in 
particular the case with regulatory variables. This suggests a possibly complex process of 
broadband adoption differs across counties, markets and cultures. 
The sample distinguishes DLS lines between fully unbundled lines and retail access. With 
local loop unbundling the competing firm physically installs equipment in the local exchange 
of the incumbent firm and connects the subscriber line it. With retail access the incumbent 
operator keeps the physical access line as it is, and the competitor basically resells the 
services supplied by the incumbent. This distinction has important implications for service 
differentiation. In the case of local loop unbundling the firm can supply quite different service 
than in the case of simple reselling. A large part of regulatory efforts and negotiation has been 
centered about the issue of unbundling, as this constitutes a much more significant intrusion 
into the infrastructure than would simple retailing activity. However, unbundling does not 
lead to inter-platform competition as the final user would still be served by the same 
subscriber line running from the central office to the home. 
In terms of regulatory metrics our broadband subscriber statistics presented in Figure 2 
suggest that full and retail unbundling represent a significant part of broadband lines 
especially in the leading Western economies. In Western Europe, one sixth of all types of broadband connections are retailed by the incumbents and one tenth is fully unbundled. In 
Northern America and Eastern Europe the retailed part of the connections rises to one third of 
the total. Inevitably this has a significant effect on the market structure and competition 
among incumbents and entrants. Nevertheless it is not certain that these clear policy 
interventions have a beneficial effect for the country level adoption.
(Figure 2) 
In our sample most countries adopted some form of unbundling after 2002 until 2010. The 
dark line in figure 3 shows the change in percent of population additions in the years prior to 
the full mandatory unbundling for the global sample. In this case a normalized metric has 
been used (% population added in an annual basis) to allow for cross-country comparisons. 
Moreover the effects from all countries have been averaged out to provide a single value for 
each observation. As pointed out in Figure 3, the rate of adoption has undergone a steady 
increase in the early years of broadband infrastructure introduction (-7 to -4 in the graph) and 
has flattened out at a constant pace until full unbundling was mandated.   
This practically means that if a country was, say, at 2% of broadband penetration at point -7, 
it reached 6.5% at year -4 and 12.5% at year -1. The introduction of unbundling boosted 
adoption by 50% in the first year and held this pace for another 4 years after initiation. In 
absolute values this is approximately 4.5% percent population from unbundling only and 
almost twice the number of subscribers that would have been added if no unbundling was not 
in place. 
In order to provide some further insights on the level of unbundling we continue this exercise 
with retail unbundling. This is a softer – for the incumbent - version of the infrastructure 
sharing mandate as the potential entrants do not have full rights on the unbundled local loop 
but are only allowed to re-sell a range of connections predefined by the incumbent operator and accepted by the local telecommunications regulator.
4
(Figure 3) 
The lightly shaded line in figure 4 shows the percent population subscribing to broadband 
connections before and after retail unbundling introduction. Contrary to the previous findings, 
the rate of adoption has held a constant increasing pace for the countries in this sample and 
there is no clear policy shock after the retail unbundling introduction. This comparison is 
much clearer when we compared with the other line.  
Table (1) presents the countries of the sample. While we used a global dataset with 192 
countries, 167 of them had sufficient demographic information to be included in out 
regressions. Table (2) presents descriptive statistics of the variables in this study.
(Table 1) 
(Table 2) 
3.2. The technology diffusion model 
All potential subscribers do not immediately adopt broadband infrastructure. The adoption 
decision takes time. Various alternative diffusion models have been used to describe such an 
adoption process by users. Out of these, the "epidemic" approach resulted to be particularly 
popular, as it fits remarkably well the diffusion path of many innovations. The adoption of 
4 There are different conventions to describe the levels of retail, ranging from simple retailing 
of incumbent’s lines to the provision of bitstream access. The main idea however is that 
infrastructure investment by the retailer is very limited. innovation by the different agents is modeled in a similar way as diseases spread in biology. 
Griliches (1957) pioneered this approach in agriculture in the study of the diffusion of hybrid 
corn and has found widespread use in the literature on technology adoption (Geroski, 2000). 
The model adopted in this study is an appropriately modified version of Gruber and Verboven 
(2001) and Bohlin et al (2010).
Let yijt denote the number of agents that have adopted the broadband telecommunications i in 
country j at time t; let   denote the total number of broadband telecommunications users in 
country j at time t. The fraction of the total number of adopters of technology generation i in 
country j that have adopted before time t is specified by the logistic distribution function: 
*
jt y








* .      (1) 
The variable ajt in (1) is a location or “timing” variable. It shifts the diffusion function 
forwards or backwards, without affecting the shape of the function otherwise. For example, 
when ajt is very high, we may say that country j at time t is very “advanced” in its adoption 
rate. The variable bjt is a measure of the diffusion growth as it equals the growth rate in the 
number of adopters at time t, relative to the fraction of adopters that have not yet adopted at 
time  t. Equivalently, this says that the number of new adopters at time t, relative to the 
fraction of adopters that have not yet adopted at time t, is a linear function of the total number 
of consumers that have already adopted at time t. This reflects the epidemic character of the 
logistic diffusion model. 
In our econometric analysis we transform equation (1) as follows: 















* log .    (2) The dependent variable, zijt, is the logarithm of total number of adopters relative to the 
number of potential adopters that have not yet adopted. Equation (2) shows that this measure 
for the level of adoption evolves linearly through time. Two essential elements determine the 
diffusion of new generations of broadband telecommunication services: the location variable, 
ajt; and the growth variable bjt. These, can be specified in a general form as follows: 
a        ( 3 )   ijt  j
0  xjt
bijt  j
0  xjt       ( 4 )  
The parameters   and   are country-specific location and growth effects. The vector 





Substituting into the transformed diffusion equation (2), the following obtains, which also 
becomes the econometric reference model of the diffusion process: 
    (5)  z ijt  j
0  xjt  j
0  xjt  t 
3.3. The technology diffusion model 
Apart from macroeconomic and technology specific variables, we have constructed several 
metrics to use in the different variants of the models. Each of them captures a different angle 
of the diffusion path and allows for a closer look at the subsequent effects. The following 
competition variables are used: 











 , with   being the number of broadband subscribers of firm i and TC
the total number of broadband subscribers. It is the sum of the squared market shares of each 
Cifirm, which is the classic Herfindahl index computed over the market shares. This index has 
the range of  1
m
 <  < HHinter  1, where m is the total number of firms in the market (the 
maximum number of firms reported in our sample is 45). The higher the value the more the 
market is tilted towards monopoly. 











9   , with   being the number of broadband subscribers for each 
network technology (DSL, FTTH, Cable, Ethernet, Fixed Wireless Broadband, Powerline 
Communications, WiMAX, Satelite, other). It is the sum of the squared technology shares of 
each platform, i.e. a sort of Herfindahl index computed over the technology shares. This index 




< HH < technology 1. The higher the value the more the market is tilted toward 
one network technology. 











n   , with T  being the number of DSL broadband subscribers in each 
country. It is the sum of the squared DSL operator shares of each platform, that is a sort of 
Herfindahl index computed over the technology shares. This index is in the range 1/k<
i
HHDSL
<1, where k is the total number of DSL based firms in the market. The higher the value the 
more the market is concentrated. 










n   , with T  being the number of Cable broadband subscribers in each 
country. It is the sum of the squared Cable operator shares of each platform, that is a sort of 
Herfindahl index computed over the technology shares. This index is in the range 1/l
<
i
HHCable <1, where l  is the total number of cable firms in the market. The higher the value 
the more the market is concentrated. 
Regulation Metrics: 
- Full Unbundling: a metric (binary variable) of full unbundling timing introduction for each 
country. This takes the value 1 once full LLU has been mandated. 
- Retail Unbundling: a metric (binary variable) of retail unbundling timing introduction for 
each country. This takes the value 1 once retail LLU has been mandated. 
- Unb_0 – Unb_4: Binary variables for each year after Full Unbundling introduction. Thus, 
Unb_0 is equal to 1 for the first year of full LLU introduction only and 0 elsewhere. Likewise 
Unb_1 is equal to 1 one year after full LLU has been mandated. We limit the dummies to 5 
years after introduction – representing half of the sample duration – as there is insignificant 
amount of observations beyond this point. 
- Ret_0 – Ret_4: Binary variables for each year after Retail Unbundling introduction. Thus, 
Ret_0 is equal to 1 for the first year of retail LLU introduction only and 0 elsewhere. Likewise 
Ret_1 is equal to 1 one year after retail LLU has been mandated. We limit the dummies to 5 
years after introduction – representing half of the sample duration – as there is insignificant 
amount of observations beyond this point. 
4. Results As discussed earlier, all diffusion models include a location specific part and a growth part. 
The model uses as location variables Population and GDPC. These variables represent the 
location effects that exist in each country in the sample. Additionally the diffusion ‘growth’ 
effects are captured by the concentration indexes of inter-technology and inter-firm 
competition. These variables are used to assess the growth impact of competition among firms 
and different network types on broadband adoption. One would expect that inter-firm 
competition and inter-platform competition to have a positive impact on the diffusion speed. 
Likewise different forms of unbundling are expected to have a positive impact on diffusion. 
In Table 3 the impact of several location and diffusion variables on broadband adoption is 
estimated. All models include controls for country and year effects for the 167 countries in the 
sample of the period 2000-2010. Population enters the results tables as an insignificant 
determinant of adoption speed across all models. GDPC is found to positively affect adoption 
and is statistically significant at the 1% level. The variables that capture the timing of 
different levels of regulatory policy introductions are both positive and significant in model 
(2). One can also notice that the effect from retail unbundling is more that twice as strong as 
the effect from full unbundling. This may shed an interesting light on the regulatory 
discussion about the extent to which service competition, achievable for instance by bitstream 
access, can contribute is furthering the diffusion of broadband access and whether full 
unbundling is essential. Full unbundling involves higher investments costs and more 
regulatory efforts. This discussion is particularly vigorous in Europe in the context of the 
appropriate network architectures of next generation network. For instance, promoters of 
extensive competition advocate for point-to-point architectures starting from scratch, where it 
is relatively easy to fully unbundle fiber local loops access. This is more difficult with 
different forms of overlay networks (e.g. GPON) which are based on the architecture of the 
incumbent’s network and hence provide an intrinsic competitive advantage to the incumbent. Overlay networks have however a lower roll-out cost, though the size wedge between the two 
is extensively discussed (see for instance WIK, 2010).  
To take into account the lags in unbundling to assess the time path of this effect, the relevant 
variables interact with year dummies in model (3) to check for the immediate effect of each 
policy introduction and how it unfolds over time. Yt indicates the year t after unbundling was 
introduced in the country. We have already seen in figures 3 and 4 that the effects are not 
uniform. This is confirmed in the econometric results. We find that the direct impact of a 
mandate of full access to the local loop has a smaller effect on broadband adoption 
immediately after introduction. This effect increases during the second and third year of the 
policy adoption, decreases slightly in the forth year and then dissipates in subsequent years. 
Retail unbundling has no direct effect of introduction during the first year for the countries 
included in the sample. After one year the retail offerings become significant determinants of 
broadband diffusion, reaching a peak level at the second year and then dissipate in the 
subsequent years. These results therefore suggest that there is a relatively strong but 
temporary effect of intra-platform competition after two years of introduction, but then this 
dissipates. This finding would shed some light on the appropriateness of introducing 
incentives for entrants to climb up the ladder of investment by introducing sunset clauses for 
unbundling.
(Table 3) 
In terms of the growth variables, we test the effect of competition among all firms in each 
market and inter-platform competition. Since the Hirschman-Herfindahl indexes are used, a 
smaller value implies a more fragmented market and a higher value a monopoly market. 
Therefore a negative sign suggests that higher competition in the broadband market triggers 
quicker diffusion of the broadband technologies.  Inter-firm competition enters all regressions with a negative and highly significant value, translating into a positive effect on diffusion. To 
the contrary, inter-platform competition has negative effects, thus impeding diffusion in the 
sample. This suggests a slower adoption speed in countries with more than one broadband 
infrastructure, while quicker adoption in single-platform markets. This runs against findings 
in other studies already mentioned on a more restricted sample, where platform competition 
increases diffusion (e.g. Denni and Gruber, 2007; Bouckaert, 2010). One explanation could be 
that such competitive settings require elements of network duplication, which ultimately leads 
to higher costs to be borne by the customers (Höffler, 2007). Platform competition may also 
reduce the need for regulation, but it could well occur at a higher cost base for providing 
services to customers.   
These findings lead us to some conclusions on the adoption determinants:  The first refers to 
regulatory provisions, in particular on unbundling of local access in the existing incumbent 
network that have taken place during the last decade in several countries. The effects of 
introduction and subsequent year-effects are always positive and significant catalysts of 
broadband diffusion. However the effects reach a peak in year 3 and then abate. 
The second conclusion suggests that intra-platform competition among firms has a direct 
effect on the markets offerings, prices, innovativeness and reach. Inter-firm competition has 
been found to critically affect diffusion in across all models. 
The third conclusion relates to platform competition from multiple technology offerings and 
the distribution of connections among them. It has been found that markets tilted towards a 
single technology usually have a quicker adoption process compared to multi-technology 
markets.    
Finally, we tested the macroeconomic parameters that have frequently been found to 
contribute to the consumption propensity for new products and services. In this case it has 
been shonw that income has a positive effect on diffusion speed. But as issues of endogeneity 
and reverse causality might exist in this case, these are further analyzed.  Before moving there, we address the issue of competition within platforms. The primary 
interest is on DSL that represents the most widely used access technology; however we 
further control for cable access too. The remaining technologies are rarely non monopolistic 
on a country basis and add very little to the explanatory value of the subject. From the results 
shown in Table 4, it becomes clear that across all specifications intra-platform competition 
among DSL operators has a significant effect of quicker adoption. Evidently equipment 
sharing further affects the infrastructure sharing and adds to intra-DSL competition. On the 
contrary, competition among cable operators is found to be insignificant. This perhaps 
suggests that the lack of extensive infrastructure sharing in cable platforms does not foster or 
even impedes competition and subsequently broadband adoption.  
(Table 4) 
Reverse causality and robustness checks 
Broadband should be considered as an example of network infrastructure and appropriate 
methodological concerns should be taken into account when assessing its economic impact. 
The economic literature on the effect of infrastructure on growth provides some guidance, by 
considering possible reverse causality in the link from income to infrastructure diffusion as 
well (Munnell, 1992).  Indeed, there is robust empirical evidence  that the diffusion of 
telecommunications infrastructure has direct and indirect effects on economic growth (Roeller 
and Waverman, 2001; Koutroumpis, 2009; Gruber and Koutroumpis, 2011). Therefore our 
specification may not adequately control for the effects that derive from the adoption of 
broadband technology itself and affect the GDP and subsequently the per capita metrics. 
Increased income leads to higher consumption propensity for technologies as Comin and 
Hobijn (2004) showed, suggesting that advanced economies are almost always the early adopters. Given the significant impact of income on technology adoption, we have devised 
two different ways to control for this effect. First, one can adequately capture the effect of 
comparative – not actual - income by using different income clusters instead of the actual 
figures. This appears to be a valid proposition to include an alternative income metric while 
avoiding the effect of reverse causality, assuming that a country would not migrate to a higher 
income band due to broadband adoption. In our case we break the sample into four equally 
populated clusters: high, medium, medium-low and low. Table 5 reproduces the same models 
as in table 3, with the difference that income variable as been substituted by a country cluster. 
Model (1) shows that the diffusion impact increases with income level; this effect is 
particularly strong passing from low to medium levels. Intra-platform competition has a 
positive impact on diffusion. The inter-platform competition parameter is not any more 
significant. However, population is now significant, but has a negative sign, suggesting that 
large countries have greater difficulties in diffusion of broadband. Models (2) and (3) show 
that the diffusion impact is bell-shaped with respect to income, peaking at the middle income 
level. Intra-platform competition again has a positive impact on diffusion, but the size of the 
impact is much smaller. Inter-platform competition parameter is not any more significant. 
Model (2) confirms the previous result of retail unbundling having a stronger impact than full 
unbundling. With respect to the time lags in model (3), also here the peak of the impact on 
diffusion speed is reached in year 3 and then declines strongly.  
(Table 5) 
Another way to tackle potential reverse causality is to use lagged values of GDPC. This is 
actually a simple way to tackle the effect of reverse causality in principle: we expect that 
broadband adoption has an impact on future GDP after having been adopted, not before. Using one year lags of personal income we manage to both measure the effect of income on 
technology adoption and at the same time isolate the reverse effect. The estimates in table 6 
derive again from the same models as before but revenue per capita is lagged by one year. All 
models show that income has a positive impact on diffusion. Inter-firm competition again has 
a positive impact on diffusion, while inter-platform competition parameter has a negative 
impact. Model (2) shows again that the effect from retail unbundling is more that twice as 
strong as the effect from full unbundling. The lags in unbundling suggest that there is an 
increasing effect of intra-platform competition until three years after introduction, but then 
this dissipates.  
(Table 6) 
To provide an additional check for the robustness of the results, we modify our technology 
adoption model. We relax the assumption imposed on the dependent variable with the use of 
S-shaped curves for broadband adoption and we simply regress the same set of variables 
against net additions of broadband subscribers (Table 7) or alternatively the net increase of 
broadband penetration (Table 8).  Clearly the size of the parameter estimates change as a 
result, but in most cases the sign and significance levels of previous results are confirmed. 
The major exception appears to be in model (3) with respect to the time profile of the impact 
of retail unbundling. Though the effect is positive, it is indeed delayed in time. 
(Table 7) 
(Table 8) 
Last, there is still a possibility that the timing of policy introduction has an effect on 
competition measurements. A regulator or government in certain cases might view the lack of competition in the market as an opportunity to impose local loop sharing. Therefore 
competition will increase because of the mandate and its timing and not through exogenous 
factors, like the launch of a new or re-use of existing platforms. This means that there might 
be some form of endogeneity between the full and retail unbundling dummies and the 
Herfindahl index of inter-firm competition. One possible way to account for this is to 
introduce a two-staged model, where the first stage measures the effect of policy intervention 
on competition, as indicated in equation 6. One would expect that both the time elapsed since 
full unbundling and  retail unbundling would be positive, i.e. the parameter estimates would 
be negative. This is confirmed by the results in table 9).
HH _Competitionijt  cj
0 Unb_timingijt  Retail_timing ijt        (6) 
(Table 9) 
Then the fitted values of inter-firm competition are used as an independent variable in the 
diffusion model. Results are shown in table 10. In the second stage of the regression the 
results essentially confirm again the previous results, in particular with displaying the 
importance of inter-firm competition.  
 (Table 10) 
 
5. Discussion 
The results related to the regulatory instruments that can be interpreted in the light of the 
discussion on the role of regulation in promoting broadband diffusion, which in many countries is a declared policy goal (OECD, 2008).  The role of competition has ambivalent 
role in this debate. On one hand competition is considered as a key driver for broadband 
diffusion, but on the other hand it is rarely clearly spelt out what elements of the networks 
should become amenable to competition. Inter-platform competition is considered as the ideal 
setting for competitive forces to unfold, but it implies full duplication of access networks, an 
objective which may be difficult to achieve in the market and which may lead to higher costs 
to users. Intra-platform competition in the sense of giving selective access to network 
elements is a solution that takes account of the difficulties in achieving the goal of inter-
platform competition, or at least in the interim period if one follows the ladder of investment 
argument. The result of this paper allows qualifying the different elements of the debate. 
First, it suggests that inter-platform competition is generally not leading to acceleration in 
broadband diffusion. This result may be surprising as it goes against the general belief that 
platform competition leads to faster broadband roll out. But one has to bear in mind that there 
are two different aspects in this debate. One is the roll out of broadband access in general. The 
second is the roll out of high speed access networks, or NGAs. The results of the paper relate 
to the first aspect. It may however well be that intra-platform competition leads to faster 
diffusion of NGA, but on top of existing broadband access. More empirical work on this is 
needed.
Second, with respect to intra-platform competition, this has been analyzed at two different 
levels: full unbundling and retail competition. In the first case the competitor is investing in 
network infrastructure to be able to induce some degree of service differentiation. With retail 
competition the scope for service differentiation is much more limited and hence competition 
is most likely centered on price. While both lead to faster diffusion, the results consistently 
show that the effect from retail competition is proportionally about twice as strong compared 
to unbundling. Moreover, the analysis of the time profile of the effects show that this impact 
on diffusion first increases until the third or fourth year after introduction, but then dissipates away. Also here one can argue that retail differentiation leads to more intense price 
competition and therefore faster diffusion. As already indicated, this may lead to interesting 
conclusions with respect to the regulatory requirements for full unbundling. This is a measure 
that is very often opposed by incumbent firms as this measure is considered intrusive with 
respect to the network architecture and requires additional investments. Another argument 
brought forward by incumbents is that full unbundling has negative effects on the incentives 
to invest for new infrastructure. This debate has reached an apex in Europe in the context of 
the ambitious broadband rollout targets provided by the European Commission’s Digital
Agenda for Europe, which aims at providing universal service type of high speed broadband 
access by the year 2020. A substantial part of this is not achievable without public subsidies, 
as investment costs are too high. With constrained public funds available, this objective has to 
be achieved to as much as possible by market forces. This raises interesting question on the 




This study has investigated into the effects of regulatory provisions in furthering diffusion of 
broadband as an innovation in the telecommunications sector using for the first time a 
worldwide dataset. The purpose was to get new insights on theoretical propositions in the 
regulatory debate with respect to the introduction of elements of competition in an 
infrastructure business that has various forms of natural monopoly. The expected result should 
shed light into the debate when extensive unbundling provisions broaden the market and 
improve the economic and consumer welfare. The results show that regulatory efforts in 
reducing market power of incumbents by introducing elements for competition through 
unbundling of selected networks elements do increase the speed of diffusion. The results 
show that inter-firm competition in general and intra-platform competition on the incumbent’s DSL platform in particular accelerate adoption of broadband, whereas there is little evidence 
that inter-platform over different access technologies in general and cable TV platforms in 
particular have such effects. Retail competition has about a twice as strong effect than local 
loop unbundling in furthering diffusion. The effect deriving from service competition is more 
powerful than the effect of regulatory provisions that should supposedly induce competitors in 
investing. At the extreme, platform competition does not seem to have an effect in furthering 
diffusion. The diffusion enhancing effect from regulatory access provisions however 
dissipates after 3-4 years. These results are robust under different hypotheses of reverse 
causality and taking into account regulatory metrics and variable endogeneity.  
This study has not made any distinction between different performance levels of broadband 
access. The policy discussion in the context of building next generation networks is based on 
the notion that this not only involved the primary diffusion of broadband, but also its upgrade 
to higher speed access. To achieve the latter substantial investment in infrastructure is needed. 
For this new investment it may not be necessarily the case that more competition will bring 
more investment, or in other words, with inter-platform competition there not are not 
necessarily reduced incentives to invest in more advanced infrastructure. The network 
duplication cost may be outweighed by the strategic consideration to invest in a new market. 
Addressing this question will be on the agenda for further work as a richer dataset will be 
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Table 1: Countries in the sample 
 
Albania Djibouti Kyrgyzstan Portugal
Algeria Dominica Laos Qatar
Andorra Dominican Republic Latvia Romania
Angola Ecuador Lebanon Russia
Argentina Egypt Libya Rwanda
Armenia El Salvador Liechtenstein Saint Kitts And Nevis
Australia Eritrea Lithuania Samoa
Austria Estonia Luxembourg Saudi Arabia
Azerbaijan Ethiopia Macao Senegal
Bahamas Faroe Islands Macedonia Serbia
Bahrain
Federated States of 
Micronesia Madagascar Singapore
Bangladesh Fiji Malaysia Slovakia
Barbados Finland Maldives Slovenia
Belarus France Mali Solomon Islands




Benin Germany Mauritania Sri Lanka
Bhutan Ghana Mauritius St Lucia
Bolivia Greece Mexico
St Vincent And The 
Grenadines
Bosnia And 
Herzegovina Greenland Moldova Sudan
Botswana Grenada Monaco Sweden
Brazil Guinea-Bissau Mongolia Switzerland
Brunei Hong Kong Montenegro Syria
Bulgaria Hungary Morocco Tanzania
Burkina Faso Iceland Mozambique Thailand
Cambodia India Namibia Trinidad And Tobago
Cameroon Indonesia Nepal Tunisia
Canada Iran Netherlands Turkey
Cape Verde Iraq New Zealand Turkmenistan
Chad Ireland Nicaragua UAE
Chile Isle Of Man Niger UK
China Israel Nigeria USA
Colombia Italy Norway Uganda
Comoros Jamaica Oman Ukraine
Congo Japan Pakistan Uruguay
The Democratic 
Republic Of The Jordan Palau Uzbekistan




Croatia Kiribati Paraguay Viet NamCyprus Korea Peru Yemen
Czech Republic Kosovo Philippines Zambia
Denmark Kuwait PolandTable 2: Summary statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Demographics     
Broadband subscribers 1340 1948631 7892375 0 1.22E+08
Income per capita
(constant $)
1691 11131.21 18788.27 0 211500.6
Mobpen 1809 4.897 20.1089 0 287.7712
Population (thousands) 1777 3.50E+07 1.31E+08 18867 1.33E+09
Technologies
(subscribers)
xdsl 1280 1324988 5439001 0 9.87E+07
fttx 349 688745.2 2454048 0 2.06E+07
cable 679 895794.3 3784145 57 4.41E+07
ethernet 65 526722.3 735520.1 100 3300000
fwb 364 57678.47 140373.4 0 790000
plc 25 13622.4 25388.23 250 90000
wimax 230 22593.85 45537.97 0 301000
other 11 6437.909 6576.22 1048 16400
sat 87 69197.99 222902.2 30 1214000
Platform Competition 1339 0.7499676 0.2353633 0.2607653 1
Regulation
incumbent retail lines 2101 658184.4 4411587 0 1.19E+08
full llu lines 2101 102771.3 736032.3 0 9594000
retail lines 2101 372356.5 2269423 0 4.35E+07
other networks retail 
lines
2101 109330.3 594117 0 1.09E+07
Technology
Competition (all modes)
1344 0.7100564 0.2524548 0.2757439 1





























































Country effects Yes Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.93 0.94 0.94
F-test/ Wald 85.58 93.43 91.68
Obs 1028 1028 1028
Standard errors reported in parentheses










































































Country effects Yes Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.95 0.95 0.95
F-test/ Wald 90.30 95.55 91.04
Obs 899 899 899
Standard errors reported in parentheses










































































Country effects Yes Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.95 0.95 0.95
F-test/ Wald 93.08 97.88 97.88
Obs 1087 1087 1087
Standard errors reported in parentheses





























































Country effects Yes Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.95 0.96 0.96
F-test/ Wald 96.81 98.85 98.40
Obs 1004 1004 1004
Standard errors reported in parentheses




























































2 0.57 0.58 0.58
F-test/ Wald 7.48 7.77 7.53
Obs 865 865 865
Standard errors reported in parentheses
***, **, * 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively  
Table 8: Delta Broadband Subscribers results 
Delta Subscribers  (1) (2) (3)























































2 0.59 0.60 0.61
F-test/ Wald 8.12 8.47 8.17
Obs 865 865 865
Standard errors reported in parentheses
***, **, * 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively Table 9: First stage results on HHI competition 
HHI Competition
First Stage Results 
 













Standard errors reported in parentheses
***, **, * 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively  
1The predicted values – from the first stage - and not the actual are used hereTable 10: Second stage results with fitted values 
Broadband Adoption 
Second Stage Results 
(VA 40%)
 



















Standard errors reported in parentheses
***, **, * 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively  
1The predicted values – from the first stage - and not the actual are used here
 